The Death of the Password: How Passwordless Login Makes Digital Identity the Internet’s Key

The Death of the Password: How Passwordless Login Makes Digital Identity the Internet’s Key

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Passwordless authentication is no longer a promise for the future. In October 2026, the FIDO Alliance estimated that around 7 billion passkeys were already in use worldwide, while aggregated data from 15 major services showed that 36% of successful sign-ins now use a passkey, up from about 26% in 2025.

The shift matters more than it may appear. For decades, online identity was almost always reduced to a fragile combination: username and password. The internet is now gradually moving towards a model in which a service no longer asks, “What secret do you know?”, but rather, “Can you cryptographically prove that you hold this identity?”

Under this model, a phone, laptop, physical security key and credential manager become parts of the identity infrastructure. Biometrics can unlock a key locally, but a fingerprint or face is not sent to the website. A passkey is not a password “stored in a phone”; it is a cryptographic key pair tied to the service’s genuine domain.

That is why the “death of the password” does not mean the internet is giving up on security. It means the opposite: your digital identity becomes the key, and the challenge shifts from remembering a secret to protecting the ecosystem that proves who you are.

Passwords were a reasonable compromise for the 1990s, not 2026

Passwords have one quality that made them almost universal: they are cheap. A website can store a hash, the user remembers a string of characters, and authentication works on nearly any device.

Yet that same advantage is also the problem. Passwords can be reused, guessed, stolen from databases, entered into phishing sites, captured by malware or obtained through social engineering. Even if a website correctly stores a password as a hash, a user can hand it to an attacker if a fake page looks convincing enough.

Adding an SMS code has reduced some of the risk, but has not eliminated it. An attacker can steal the password and persuade the user to enter the code as well. Other MFA methods, including push approvals, can be abused by bombarding a user with requests until they accept one by mistake.

Passkeys address the problem at a more fundamental level: there is no secret that a user can copy into a fake form.

How a passkey works without sending the private key over the internet

When you create a passkey, your device or credential manager generates a cryptographic key pair. The service receives the public key. The private key remains protected on the device or within the credential manager’s synchronisation system.

When signing in, the website sends a cryptographic challenge. The device signs it with the private key after the user gives consent — for example through Face ID, a fingerprint, a PIN or Windows Hello. The website verifies the signature using the public key.

The private key does not need to reach the server. Moreover, the credential is associated with the service for which it was created. A fake phishing page cannot simply request from the browser the passkey intended for the genuine domain.

This is why FIDO, Microsoft, Google, Apple and national security agencies describe passkeys as phishing-resistant, not merely “more convenient than passwords”.

For more information on passkeys, see also Fake authentication attacks are stealing Microsoft 365 accounts at scale, which provides complementary details on the subject.

Biometrics are not the passkey — and do not go to Google, Apple or the site you are signing into

A common misunderstanding is that moving to passkeys means websites receive a user’s fingerprint or facial image. That is not the model.

Google explicitly says that biometric data used to unlock a passkey remains on the device and is not transmitted to the company. Apple describes the same principle: Face ID, Touch ID or the device passcode locally authorises use of the cryptographic credential.

In practical terms, biometrics are the local mechanism through which a device verifies that the person in front of it may use the key. If you do not want to use biometrics, or cannot use them, many systems allow a local device PIN or password instead.

In 2026, passkeys moved from an option to routine use

On 15 October 2026, the FIDO Alliance published the Passkey Index 2026, based on aggregated data from 15 major services including Google, Microsoft, Amazon, PayPal, TikTok, WhatsApp, JPMorgan Chase and Shopify.

Its central finding was that adoption no longer simply means “the website offers the option”. Around 36% of successful sign-ins at participating services used a passkey, compared with 26% the previous year.

FIDO also reported two practical differences: passkey sign-ins have a success rate of around 93%, compared with 78% for traditional MFA methods, and are nearly three times faster, saving an average of around 27 seconds per sign-in.

Separately, the State of Passkeys 2026 report, based on 11,000 consumers in ten countries, found in May that 90% of respondents had heard of passkeys, 75% had enabled at least one, and 49% used them regularly when available.

Microsoft began making passkeys the default method in enterprise environments

One of the clearest signs that the transition is becoming infrastructure comes from Microsoft Entra ID. From 1 September 2026, Microsoft began a rollout under which users eligible for SMS or voice authentication are automatically enabled for passkeys and prompted to register a phishing-resistant method.

The company explicitly says that its goal is not merely to add a stronger method, but to gradually eliminate credentials that can be phished. In January 2027, Microsoft also intends to remove security questions as an account-reset method in Entra ID.

The approach addresses the central problem: if you keep a highly secure passkey but allow an account to be reset through a weak method, an attacker will not target the passkey. They will target the recovery process.

WebAuthn Level 3 became a W3C standard in August 2026

Passkeys do not belong to one company. They are built on open FIDO and WebAuthn standards. On 25 August 2026, the W3C published Web Authentication Level 3 as a Recommendation.

The standard defines how web applications create and use public-key cryptographic credentials, how the browser interacts with the authenticator, and how user consent is protected.

This matters for the internet because passwordless authentication no longer depends on a proprietary implementation from a single browser or phone maker. Apple, Google, Microsoft and independent providers can implement the same core infrastructure.

Synced passkeys: the greatest convenience and the biggest model shift

Early FIDO credentials were often strictly tied to one device. This approach is highly secure, but can become inconvenient for an ordinary user who changes phones or has several computers.

Synced passkeys solve that problem through credential managers such as iCloud Keychain, Google Password Manager and other compatible providers. If a user securely recovers their main account, their credentials can become available again on a new device.

Apple says iCloud Keychain uses strong encryption and that Apple cannot read the data. If all devices are lost, recovery mechanisms may involve a recovery contact, iCloud Keychain escrow, a trusted phone number and the old device passcode.

There is, however, an important consequence: the account that synchronises passkeys becomes a higher-level identity. If you lose access to that ecosystem, the problem is no longer recovering one password, but recovering the wallet that holds keys for many services.

Losing a phone should not mean losing your identity

In a well-designed system, a lost phone should not destroy access to every account. Synced passkeys exist precisely to provide redundancy. A user may have several trusted devices, a synced credential manager or physical FIDO keys as backups.

But that is also why recovery must be treated as part of authentication rather than an afterthought. An attacker who cannot steal the passkey may try to persuade support staff to reset the account, take over the phone number or compromise the recovery email.

Microsoft warns of precisely this risk: an account’s security is limited by the weakest available access or recovery route.

The paradox: when the password disappears, the device PIN becomes far more important

Passkeys are phishing-resistant, but that does not make the local device irrelevant. If someone steals your phone and knows its unlock code, they may gain access to many locally protected resources.

This is why the passwordless future shifts some of the pressure onto device security: better local passcodes, anti-theft protections, timeouts, secure hardware, suspicious-behaviour detection and the ability to revoke access remotely.

For users, the lesson is straightforward: having “a good password” is no longer enough. You need a sound identity ecosystem.

Android begins allowing passkeys to move between managers

One early criticism of passkeys was the risk of lock-in. If all your keys are synchronised in one ecosystem, how easily can you leave?

In September 2026, Google introduced an Android method enabling users to move passwords and passkeys directly between compatible managers, without exporting them to an unencrypted text file. Google Password Manager, 1Password, Bitwarden and Dashlane were among the services initially announced.

The change follows the direction set out in the FIDO Credential Exchange specifications, which seek to define a format and secure protocol for moving credentials between providers.

This detail is fundamental to the future of identity. If passkeys become the key to the internet, users must be able to change providers without manually rebuilding their identity site by site.

Why phishing becomes harder, but social engineering does not disappear

A passkey cannot be entered into a fake form in the way a password can. That removes one of the most effective tools of conventional phishing.

Attackers adapt, however. They may try to steal a session after sign-in, install malware, persuade a user to approve a security change or exploit account recovery.

In a passwordless internet, the attack does not disappear; it shifts from “tell me the secret” to “convince the system or the person that I am the legitimate account holder”.

InfoBuz has separately explained how phishing works and what to do after opening a suspicious link. Passkeys substantially reduce the category of attacks that steal passwords, but do not replace vigilance against recovery fraud or fake support.

Digital identity is becoming infrastructure, not a list of passwords

As passkeys, digital wallets and identity verification mature, the internet is beginning to treat identity as a cryptographic object that can prove different things without continually exposing a reusable secret.

For one service, you only need to prove that you are the account holder. For another, you may need to demonstrate a certain age or professional qualification. The future of digital identity does not necessarily mean a central database containing all of a person’s information, but different credentials controlled by the user and presented selectively.

Passkeys are only the authentication component of this transformation, but they are probably the most visible one because they replace an action people repeat dozens of times a day: typing a password.

When an AI agent works on your behalf, identity becomes even more critical

Microsoft explicitly links the move to phishing-resistant authentication with the emergence of AI agents. The reason is simple: if an agent is permitted to send messages, access files or execute workflows, compromising a user’s identity can give an attacker access to a multiplier of actions.

In the agentic era, a stolen password no longer provides access only to an inbox. It may provide access to an agent authorised to act in other systems.

This is why passkeys and phishing-resistant authentication are becoming not just a UX improvement, but a foundation for the AI-agent economy.

InfoBuz examined this shift in its article on AI agents beginning to take over complete workflows. The more we delegate to software, the more important it becomes for the system to know with certainty on whose behalf it is acting.

What happens when your device becomes the key to the internet

There is an interesting psychological shift. In the password era, the key to identity was something you knew. In the passkey era, the key becomes something you possess and can unlock.

That makes the experience simpler, but also makes the device more valuable. The phone is no longer simply a screen displaying accounts; it becomes an authenticator, a credential wallet and a recovery point.

This is why platforms are investing simultaneously in anti-theft protections, recovery contacts, secure hardware, biometric unlocking, recovery codes and encrypted synchronisation.

Synced passkey or physical key: there is no single answer

For most people, synced passkeys offer the best balance between security and recovery. For administrative accounts, critical infrastructure or particularly high-risk roles, organisations may prefer device-bound credentials or physical FIDO keys.

A cloud administrator may have entirely different requirements from a user signing in to an online shop. This is precisely why the standards allow multiple authenticator types and policies.

The important point is that an organisation should not mistake “passwordless” for “without policies”. The stronger the credential, the more carefully enrolment, revocation and recovery must be designed.

What must happen before passwords truly disappear

  • More services must eliminate password fallback entirely. As long as a password remains active, it can remain the attack route.
  • Recovery must become as phishing-resistant as authentication.
  • Moving between managers must be straightforward. Users should not be locked into a single ecosystem.
  • Websites must provide consistent UX. Today, the names and placement of options vary widely.
  • Enterprise organisations must solve the full identity lifecycle. Hiring, enrolment, device changes, device loss and an employee’s departure.
  • Users must understand that biometric data is not sent to the website. Otherwise, adoption may be slowed by concerns based on a misunderstood architecture.

The password will not disappear in a single day

The internet will operate in a mixed environment for many years. Some services will be fully passwordless. Others will accept passkeys but keep passwords as a backup. Older websites will continue using passwords long after modern platforms have moved on.

Still, the direction is clear. FIDO already estimates that 7 billion passkeys are in use. Microsoft is making them the default method in Entra ID. Android allows them to move between managers, Apple synchronises them in encrypted form across devices, and WebAuthn Level 3 is a W3C standard.

These are no longer isolated trials. They are components of shared infrastructure.

The death of the password does not mean the death of authentication

The biggest change is conceptual. A password requires a user to keep a secret and transmit it every time. A passkey requires a device to cryptographically prove possession of a key without exposing that key.

The result can be both more secure and easier to use — a rare combination in security. But success depends on what is built around it: recovery, portability, device protection and clear rules around identity.

On the internet to come, we may no longer need to remember dozens of passwords. Instead, we will need to understand something more important: who holds the keys to our digital identity, how we recover them and how we move them when changing ecosystems.

For the practical side — enabling passkeys on Android, iPhone and Windows, backup methods and mistakes to avoid — InfoBuz has published a separate guide: Passkeys in 2026: how to replace passwords without being locked out of your accounts.

Frequently asked questions about passwordless authentication

Are passkeys and biometrics the same thing? No. The passkey is the cryptographic credential. Biometrics may be used locally to authorise its use.

Does Google or Apple receive my fingerprint when I use a passkey? Not in the normal flow. Biometric data is used locally to unlock the authenticator.

What happens if I lose my phone? Synced passkeys can be restored through the credential manager and the account’s recovery mechanisms. For device-bound credentials, you need an additional method or a second key.

Do passkeys eliminate phishing completely? They largely eliminate phishing based on password theft, but do not eliminate malware, session theft, device compromise or fraud targeting the recovery process.

Can I move passkeys between managers? In 2026, this is beginning to become possible. Android introduced direct transfer between several managers, while FIDO is developing Credential Exchange standards for interoperability.

Will passwords disappear completely? Probably not quickly. The internet will remain in a mixed model for a long time, but major services and enterprise environments are moving ever more clearly towards phishing-resistant, passwordless authentication.

Sources and transparency

Etichete: Passwordless authenticationBiometricsFIDO2Google Password ManageriCloud KeychainDigital identityMicrosoft Entra IDPasskeys
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