Cities’ digital dependence can turn a useful IT investment into a risk for residents when a local authority can no longer manage its data, accounts or services without a single provider. What happens if the company becomes insolvent, licence prices rise or a cloud platform goes down? This analysis examines technical and contractual risks, EU and Romanian rules, hidden costs and ways for public authorities to keep operating.
Cities’ digital dependence: the problem behind an app that works
A city hall may buy an online portal, parking-management software, licences for its registry office or a traffic-monitoring platform. To residents, these are separate services. To the local authority, they may depend on the same provider, a central account, a maintenance contract or a database that nobody else knows how to administer. When that link breaks, it is not necessarily just one application that disappears: the processes behind it are affected.
The risk is not evidence that a provider has done something wrong, or that outsourcing is a poor decision. Services managed by specialists can bring savings, security and functions that would be too expensive to build locally. The problem arises when a city can no longer verify, continue or transfer a service without the consent, staff and infrastructure of a single company.
What vendor lock-in means, and how it can arise at city hall
Vendor lock-in is the disproportionate difficulty of replacing a supplier even where technical alternatives exist. It may result from proprietary data formats, exclusive integration, licences, missing documentation, migration costs or operational reliance on a company’s specialists. There can also be contractual dependence: the provider alone holds administrator passwords or access to cloud services, even though the authority pays for the system.
A proprietary product is not automatically insecure, and an open-source product does not guarantee portability. If an open system lacks documentation, capable staff or access to its configurations, moving it can be just as difficult. The relevant test is whether the administration can effectively control data, access, contracts and the exit mechanism.
Five layers of dependence: data, application, infrastructure, people and contract
The first layer is data: if an export is unavailable or loses relationships between records, switching becomes costly. The second is the application, which may use modules or licences tied to a single platform. The third is infrastructure: servers, cloud services, networks, digital identity and hardware components. The fourth is operational knowledge, concentrated in two or three people. The fifth is the contract, which may not require documentation to be handed over when it ends.
The greatest vulnerability arises when these layers overlap. A backup may exist, but its file cannot be read without the original application. Source code may be handed over, but cannot be reused without the necessary rights or a build environment. Or administrators may have access to a server but cannot change its configuration because the application is controlled through the contractor’s account.
Which local systems can be affected when a provider disappears
Examples include records of local taxes and charges, registry services, document management, in-person appointment booking, parking-space administration, transport displays, residents’ reports, smart lighting, water telemetry and traffic boards. The extent of the impact depends on the actual architecture and on how services are separated. Not every municipality uses the same platform, and not every service listed is run by the same institution.
In one scenario, a resident portal may go down while the internal system keeps operating. In another, an interruption to central authentication may block several applications at once. Before claiming that a city is vulnerable, it is necessary to know its specific dependencies and continuity plans, not merely the product list in a procurement.
A fictional scenario: when a parking platform becomes unavailable
Imagine a city that has outsourced its parking-payment app, the issuing of subscriptions and part of on-site validation. One morning, the provider’s authentication platform stops responding. Drivers cannot confirm a payment, operators cannot see recent subscriptions and the control centre receives complaints. This scenario is invented to explain a risk; it does not describe an incident attributed to any real city hall or company.
The appropriate response should be determined before an incident: how the unavailability is communicated publicly, whether alternative payment methods exist, who can suspend enforcement within the limits of their legal authority, how payments already made are checked and how data are later reconciled. Without such a procedure, a technical problem becomes a dispute with residents.
A cloud outage does not automatically mean data were stolen
When a cloud provider or shared platform has problems, services may become unavailable without data having been exfiltrated. Availability, integrity and confidentiality are distinct dimensions of security. A configuration error can stop authentication, a ransomware attack can affect files, and a communications failure can interrupt access even if servers are working.
Before using the term “data breach”, an institution should assess the incident and the information that has been confirmed. An example of shared technological dependence is also examined in InfoBuz’s article on the Microsoft 365 outage and the effects of shared infrastructure. The link explains a general mechanism and does not demonstrate that any Romanian city hall was affected.
Municipal data: rights of access, export and use
Tender specifications should establish which categories of data a system manages: requests, documents, transactions, logs, geospatial data, change histories and metadata. A statement such as “the data belong to the beneficiary” is insufficient if it does not define the export format, frequency, rights of use, integrity and the way another operator can import the datasets.
A contractual export obligation may require files in documented formats, a data dictionary, relationships between tables, status codes and a restoration test. Personal data, legitimate trade secrets, classified information and datasets subject to special regimes require suitable safeguards. Administrative portability does not mean uncontrolled publication of databases.
An open API does not mean unprotected access
A documented API can allow information to move between registry services, payments, records and other systems without continuous manual exports. Specifications, authentication, the data schema, version management and testing matter for interoperability. A technical interface truly exists only if it can be used by an authorised integrator, with documentation, credentials and clear rules.
Openness does not mean that anyone on the internet should be able to call an API and view personal information. Authorisation, rate limiting, logging and data separation are necessary. A city hall can require interoperability without demanding the internal code of an entire platform or compromising confidentiality.
Why tender specifications matter in public IT procurement
The public procurement guide administered by Romania’s National Agency for Public Procurement (ANAP) stresses the role of tender specifications in precisely defining outcomes, quality, deadlines and competition. For public-sector software, objectives should not be reduced to “a functional portal” and “12 months of maintenance”. Requirements should describe the outcome, service levels, security, integration, accessibility, migration and handover when the contract ends.
The same guide warns that weak specifications can lead to contract amendments and results below expectations. Procurement practice also requires objective requirements and respect for competition, rather than conditions written solely in one manufacturer’s language. Where specifications refer to standards, the rules on the phrase “or equivalent” must be considered in line with Law No. 98/2016 and the nature of the procurement.
Five-year total cost: an example that changes the comparison
The purchase price does not show what a system will cost until it is replaced. For comparison, consider two entirely hypothetical bids. Bid A has implementation costs of 400,000 lei, annual operation and licensing costs of 240,000 lei, and estimated final migration costs of 350,000 lei. Bid B has implementation costs of 650,000 lei, annual operating costs of 150,000 lei and estimated migration costs of 120,000 lei. These are not prices observed at any city hall.
Over five years, Bid A totals 400,000 + 5 × 240,000 + 350,000 = 1,950,000 lei. Bid B totals 650,000 + 5 × 150,000 + 120,000 = 1,520,000 lei. The difference is 430,000 lei, although implementation for Bid B was more expensive. The example excludes inflation, financial discounting, changes in volume, internal costs and other risks; it shows a method, not who should win a tender.
| Component | Bid A (hypothetical) | Bid B (hypothetical) |
|---|---|---|
| Initial implementation | 400,000 lei | 650,000 lei |
| Annual operation and licences | 240,000 lei | 150,000 lei |
| Operation over 5 years | 1,200,000 lei | 750,000 lei |
| Estimated migration / exit | 350,000 lei | 120,000 lei |
| Estimated total cost over 5 years | 1,950,000 lei | 1,520,000 lei |
The hidden risk: continuity of public services during migration
Changing provider cannot mean arbitrarily stopping essential public services. A migration should include stages, integrity checks, a test environment, a period of parallel operation where necessary and a rollback plan. What matters is being able to show that documents, records and transactions have transferred completely, not simply that the new portal opens.
In some systems, certain short interruptions may be acceptable and publicly announced; in others, continuity is much more important. The conditions should be set through an impact analysis for each service. An institution that receives a backup every month but has never restored it on separate infrastructure does not yet know whether it can recover after a failure.
A backup does not automatically mean recovery: RTO and RPO
RTO is the target time for restoring a service after an interruption. RPO expresses the maximum amount of data, measured in time, that an organisation accepts it may lose during recovery. If a service is assigned, purely as an illustration, an RTO of four hours and an RPO of 30 minutes, planning and testing must demonstrate that these targets can be met under the relevant risk conditions.
These figures are not universally mandatory deadlines set by legislation. A public-information application may have different tolerances from a system handling important operations. Define targets with the service’s users, then verify separate copies, access control, actual restoration and periodic tests. The security guide on operational continuity sets out the need for recovery procedures and exercises.
Who controls passwords, cloud accounts and domains?
A system can depend on apparently secondary services: the domain name, TLS certificate, employee identity system, cloud administration account, application registry, signing key or email provider. If all are opened under the account of a single outside person, the administration may lose access even while the technical infrastructure still exists.
Separate institutional accounts from provider accounts and use delegated access with limited rights, multi-factor authentication and auditing of administrative sessions. The contract should provide for the handover of legitimate control, revocation of access at the end and recovery procedures. Never publish passwords in public annexes or tender documents.
When the contractor uses hidden subcontractors
A prime provider may use other suppliers for hosting, payments, communications, support or development. That is not prohibited in itself and can bring specialisation, but it creates a network of dependencies. The institution needs to know which critical services are subcontracted, what data access exists and how significant changes are managed.
For personal data, Article 28 of the GDPR sets specific conditions concerning processors and the use of other processors, as well as contractual obligations on security, assistance and audits. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 also requires a choice between returning or erasing personal data at the end of service provision, subject to the law. These requirements do not, however, replace technical planning for migrating an entire application.
GDPR: residents’ data should not be confused with ownership of the software
A city hall that determines the purposes and main means of processing may be a data controller, while a company processing information on its behalf may be a processor. The legal classification depends on the real roles, not on the label used in a contract. A GDPR contract should specify the purpose, duration, categories of data, instructions, security, subcontractors, assistance and end-of-contract conditions.
An institution’s right to receive data back does not automatically mean it receives copyright in all source code or the provider’s technology. Intellectual property, licences and rights over specifically developed components must be negotiated and clarified. A responsible exit is possible without requiring the purchase of all the provider’s trade secrets.
The Data Act: what changes when switching cloud providers in 2027
Regulation (EU) 2023/2854, the Data Act, applicable for the most part from 12 September 2025, introduces rules intended to reduce obstacles to switching data-processing service providers, such as certain cloud and edge services. The European Commission explains obligations concerning switching, contractual transparency and interoperability. These provisions apply to services and conditions within the regulation’s scope.
The Data Act provides for the removal of switching charges, including certain data-transfer (egress) costs, from 12 January 2027. Until then, a transitional regime applies to eligible costs. This does not make every migration service, custom development project, licence or early termination free of charge, and it does not guarantee compatibility for every type of software. Sources: European Commission – Data Act explained and the text of the regulation.
The Interoperable Europe Act: where the requirements apply from 2025
Regulation (EU) 2024/903 seeks interoperability in trans-European digital public services. Some provisions have applied since 12 July 2024, while relevant requirements concerning interoperability assessments have applied since 12 January 2025. For certain decisions on new or substantially modified mandatory requirements affecting the cross-border interoperability of the services covered, institutions must carry out the assessments provided for by the regulation.
It would not be correct to say that every city hall buying a computer or changing its website must automatically carry out the same assessment. The precise scope is defined by the regulation and the type of requirement. Still, the practical principle is valuable for local projects too: clear standards, documented formats and the ability of different systems to exchange data lawfully and securely. Sources: the Interoperable Europe Act and the Commission’s guide to assessments.
NIS2 and Romania: not every city hall has the same classification automatically
The European NIS2 Directive concerns the cybersecurity of entities in relevant sectors. Romania adopted Emergency Ordinance No. 155/2024, approved with amendments through Law No. 124/2025 and subsequently supplemented. Classification as an essential or important entity depends on the type of entity, activity and applicable national rules. The scope of local public administration should not be presented as identical in every country to that of central authorities.
The European Commission and ENISA state that the inclusion of local authorities in NIS2 may depend on Member States’ decisions. A local authority should check its obligations under the Romanian legal framework and guidance from DNSC, rather than assuming either that it is excluded or that it is automatically an essential entity. Sources: Law 124/2025 – Chamber of Deputies and European Commission – NIS2 FAQ.
What a continuity plan should look like when a provider ceases trading
The plan starts with an inventory of systems, data, accounts, and technical and human dependencies. It identifies the institution’s administrators and the provider’s contacts, establishes minimum alternatives for residents, specifies which services stop and how this is announced. The contract should include the handover procedure, access to backups, documentation, transferable keys or licences, and transition assistance.
Continuity is not simply a matter of “buying other software”. Recovery of data and reconciliation of operations carried out during the incident must be tested. In a payment system, for example, it is not acceptable to count transactions twice or lose the legal references to accounting documents. In a reporting system, the history and person responsible for every case must remain verifiable.
Exit clauses a city hall should negotiate before signing
A practical set includes: export and import rights; the frequency of data delivery; formats and a data dictionary; system documentation; an obligation to assist with migration for an agreed period; access to logs and transaction histories; an access-revocation procedure; retention or deletion of personal data in accordance with the law; and management of licences and third-party components. Security checks and an incident-escalation process also need to be agreed.
There is no single clause that is right for every product. For software developed exclusively to order, deliverables may include code and installation instructions if the rights have been negotiated. For standard commercial products, the plan may use export formats and APIs without claiming all proprietary code. It is important for this distinction to be clear before a bid is selected.
| Contractual indicator | What should be defined |
|---|---|
| Availability | Measurement method, period, exclusions and reporting |
| Incident response | Channel, severity, acknowledgement time and escalation |
| RTO and RPO | Values selected through impact analysis and recovery testing |
| Backup | Frequency, segregation, encryption, retention and verification |
| Data export | Format, completeness, dictionary and frequency |
| Migration / transition | Rights, timetable, support, price and acceptance test |
| Subcontractors | Notification, approval where required, data protection |
A tested transition plan is worth more than a promise on paper
An institution could require a provider, periodically or whenever there is a major change, to demonstrate export in a documented format and import into an authorised test environment. The result should be recorded: what data were transferred, which integrity checks passed, which fields remained incompatible and how long it took. Where possible, a test may use synthetic or anonymised data to limit risks.
It is not enough for a company to show a screenshot of an “Export” button. An archive that omits attachments, relationships or important logs may be useless for continuity. The contract may make final acceptance of the deliverable, or certain payment instalments, conditional on demonstrating essential functions, in compliance with the procurement framework.
Who is responsible for digital control within the administration?
IT projects are sometimes seen as the exclusive responsibility of the technical department. In practice, services also affect the finance department, registry office, legal team, procurement, data protection officer, public communications and institutional leadership. They should take part in defining processes and accepting results, not merely in signing the contract.
A technical lead can assess architecture and security, but cannot alone decide which accounting document must be retained or what the lawful procedure is for resolving a petition. A multidisciplinary team reduces the risk that an institution buys visible features while overlooking the rest of its administrative work.
How to measure vendor dependence without inventing an index
Rather than using a mysterious score, we propose five verifiable tests. Can the institution export its data without exclusive assistance? Does it control the administrative accounts and domains? Does it have up-to-date technical documentation? Has it tested restoring the system from an independent copy? Can another authorised operator take over the service under an existing plan? Every answer should be supported by evidence, not simply statements.
A simple maturity sheet can use labels such as “tested”, “documented but untested”, “unclear” and “non-existent”. This is an editorial method proposed by InfoBuz, not a European standard with an official score. A system may perform well on export but poorly on continuity; results should be presented by dimension rather than hidden in an average.
Municipal risks are not limited to ransomware
A cyber incident is a serious threat, but dependence can become critical without an attack. A provider may become insolvent, change its licensing policy, end support for a version, lose key staff or alter its cloud infrastructure. Likewise, power and telecommunications outages can affect a system that is well protected against malware.
The ENISA Threat Landscape 2026 report highlights the impact of ransomware and public services’ exposure to threats, but this does not mean every municipal interruption results from an attack. A competent assessment classifies the event, establishes a probable cause only after checks and tracks the effect on residents.
| Risk | Possible effect | Mitigation measure |
|---|---|---|
| Data in a proprietary format | Incomplete migration, unusable archive | Tested export, documented schema, integrity check |
| Identity / cloud controlled externally | Administrative lockout, lost access | Institutional accounts, delegated access, recovery procedure |
| Unknown subcontractor | No control over a critical process | Subcontractor inventory, GDPR and security rules |
| System unavailable | Requests or payments suspended | Alternative plan, recovery test, public communication |
| Unclear termination costs | Unpredictable budget when changing contract | Exit plan and migration prices defined in advance |
| Missing documentation | Dependence on the provider’s employees | Periodic handover and independent operations test |
What should be published transparently about a public IT contract
Within the limits of legislation and the protection of sensitive information, an institution can publish the contract’s subject, selection criteria, value, duration, service levels, availability indicators and the general approach to continuity. Transparency does not require posting passwords, encryption keys, diagrams that expose vulnerabilities or personal data.
For residents, useful questions include: what service is supported, what happens if it becomes unavailable, what annual costs exist and whether the authority can change provider without losing its archives. A transparent tender can avoid favouring a particular technology, but it must remain technically precise enough to guarantee the intended outcome.
Choosing open-source software: a possible advantage, not a magic fix
Open-licence software can make audits, portability and the involvement of multiple providers easier if the architecture and documentation are adequate. Still, the freedom to view code does not automatically ensure available specialists, security, maintenance, translations or compatibility with existing databases. A commercial product may have excellent APIs and mature export procedures.
Choose technology on the basis of the service’s needs, risks and total cost, not a label. A sound solution may combine commercial products, open technologies and standardised integrations. What matters is that there is a realistic route for switching, lawful licensing and sufficient administrative expertise.
What residents gain when an institution is not trapped in a single system
A city hall able to migrate and restore services can reduce the duration of some interruptions, negotiate costs more effectively and avoid needlessly rebuilding its database whenever a contract changes. Residents see the effects especially when an online request can be tracked, information does not have to be re-entered, and payments or documents remain accessible after a platform changes.
This benefit cannot be demonstrated by a tender promise alone. Availability, resolution time and the number of requests affected by outages need to be measured. For Romanian context, InfoBuz has previously documented the gap between catalogued public services and those that are fully online.
A 15-question checklist for a city hall before procurement
Before tendering: (1) what is the critical public service; (2) what personal data and documents does it manage; (3) what are the export formats; (4) is there a documented API; (5) who controls the accounts and domains; (6) what are the operating costs over five years; (7) what rights of use or licences are needed after termination; (8) which subcontractors access the system; (9) how backups are made; (10) how restoration is verified.
Before signing and acceptance: (11) who responds during incidents; (12) what the recovery targets and testing method are; (13) what documentation deliverables are required; (14) how migration assistance is ensured; (15) what portability and continuity tests are carried out. Well-designed tender specifications should turn the answers into verifiable obligations, rather than leave them in a commercial presentation.
Frequently asked questions: IT contracts, cloud services and city applications
Is it illegal for a city hall to work with one provider? Not in itself. The legality of procurement depends on the procedure and the specific conditions; operational risk must be managed. Must source code automatically be handed over? No; it depends on the licence, the subject of the contract and the rights negotiated. Does a backup guarantee recovery? Not without tested restoration and access to the appropriate format.
From 2027, can any software be moved free of charge? No; the Data Act concerns certain data-processing services and types of charges, not every project cost. Does NIS2 apply automatically to every city hall? Not without checking the scope of national legislation. Can an API containing personal data be completely open? No; interoperability must be accompanied by authorisation and security.
Other InfoBuz analyses on digitalisation and public administration
To understand the vulnerability of systems that use shared infrastructure, read Microsoft 365 outage: how many services depend on the same infrastructure. For the economic dimension, see the analysis of local public debt and risks to investment. Digitalisation should be assessed not only by the licences bought, but also by maintenance costs and service continuity.
A complementary guide on citizens’ perspectives is Digital skills in Romania: fast internet and unequal access to services. This analysis concerns the contractual and technical relationship between public administrations and providers; it does not promote a manufacturer or platform.
Official sources and research methodology
The main sources on procurement and interoperability are ANAP – drafting tender specifications, ANAP – standards and equivalent requirements, Regulation (EU) 2024/903 and European Commission – when an interoperability assessment is required.
For data, security and migration: GDPR, Articles 28 and 32; Data Act explained and Regulation (EU) 2023/2854; NIS2 FAQ; Law 124/2025; and ENISA Threat Landscape 2026. Editorial review on 22 November 2026. The scenarios and amounts are editorially constructed and do not constitute an audit of real institutions.










Discuția cititorilor
Ai o opinie sau o întrebare despre acest articol? Spune-ne ce crezi.
Fii primul care deschide discuția.
Te rugăm să păstrezi un limbaj civilizat și să discuți la subiect. Comentariile spam sunt filtrate automat.